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Abstract 
 
Research has demonstrated that situational factors such as perceived threats to the social order 
activate latent authoritarianism. The deadly COVID-19 pandemic presents a rare opportunity to 
test whether existential threat stemming from an indiscriminate virus moderates the relationship 
between authoritarianism and political attitudes toward the nation and outgroups. Using data from 
two large nationally representative samples of adults in the United Kingdom (N = 2,025) and 
Republic of Ireland (N = 1,041) collected during the initial phases of strict lockdown measures in 
both countries, we find that the associations between right-wing authoritarianism and 1) 
nationalism and 2) anti- immigrant attitudes are conditional on levels of perceived threat. As 
anxiety about the COVID-19 pandemic increases, so too does the effect of right-wing 
authoritarianism on those political outcomes. Thus, it appears that existential threats to humanity 
from the COVID-19 pandemic moderate expressions of authoritarianism in society. 
  
THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
 
Scholars have long argued that perceptions of ingroup threat are central to the 
“authoritarian personality” (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, 2001; Feldman & 
Stenner, 1997; Sales, 1972). Much of this research focuses on how outgroups pose what scholars 
label “normative” threats to the social order (i.e., threats to the values, traditions, and social 
diversity of the ingroup) or economic threats to material resources. For example, several studies 
demonstrate that perceived threat related to economic competition (Rickert, 1998), security and 
stability in society (Roccato & Russo, 2017; Roccato, Vieno & Russo, 2014), and social 
cohesion (Stenner, 2005) moderates the association between right-wing authoritarianism and 
prejudicial attitudes. However, other scholars argue that we should also consider how threats to 
one’s very existence (e.g., the 9/11 terrorist attacks) interact with authoritarianism (Cohrs et al., 
2005; Kossowska et al., 2011; Lavine et al. 2002, 2005; cf. Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). In 
fact, some researchers find that existential threats stemming from terrorism have larger effect 
sizes on political attitudes and behaviors than we might find from economic threats (e.g., see 
Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009).  
The COVID-19 pandemic, which has already killed more than a million people 
worldwide, offers us a rare opportunity to test whether existential threat stemming from a virus 
moderates the relationship between authoritarianism and political attitudes toward the nation and 
outgroups. In line with the above-mentioned interactionist perspectives, we argue that perception 
of this existential threat will interact with authoritarianism, increasing its influence on ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup derogation (Feldman, 2003). What makes our study novel, however, is 
that this threat is not inherently derived from political or cultural contestation, nor from the 
deliberate actions of a hostile outgroup (Kossowska et al. 2011). Although important political 
actors, including those from the Trump Administration, have used political rhetoric to attach 
blame to other countries or immigrants (e.g., “Chinese virus” or “Wuhan virus”; Nossem, 2020; 
Kuo, 2020; Vazquez & Klein, 2020; Zarhloule, 2020), COVID-19 poses an indiscriminate, and 
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inherently global existential threat with no delimited enemy. Using nationally representative 
survey data collected from two European countries during the initial phases of the COVID-19 
global pandemic, we investigate the following research question: Does the existential threat from 
COVID-19 strengthen the relationship between authoritarianism and prejudicial political 
attitudes?  
 
Theory and Expectations 
According to Strong (1990, p. 249), large-scale epidemics of fatal diseases present serious 
obstacles to social order by producing “fear, panic, stigma, moralising and calls to action”, 
effects that are most pronounced when a disease is “new, unexpected, or particularly 
devastating”. Drury and Tekin Guven (2020), however, critique this “panic narrative”, pointing 
out that collective behavior in emergencies is more complex than this perspective suggests (see 
also Drury, Novelli & Stott, 2013; Ntontis, Drury, Amlôt, Rubin & Williams, 2019). In 
particular, while they can instil suspicion of others and the fear that they might transmit the 
disease, leading to prejudicial attitudes and behaviors (Strong, 1990; Adida et al. 2020), 
pandemics can also inspire acts of unity, compassion and solidarity (Aguirre, Torres, Gill & 
Hotchkiss, 2011; Drury, Cocking & Reicher, 2009; Ntontis & Rocha, 2020; Solnit, 2009), 
especially when there is a sense of shared fate (Drury et al., 2019). Nevertheless, from the initial 
stages of the current COVID-19 pandemic there have been reports of increased violence against 
people from black and minority ethnic backgrounds, particularly targeted against people from 
Asian communities (Aratani, 2020; Campbell, 2020). In addition, far-right political groups have 
reportedly used the pandemic to promote anti-immigration and anti-Muslim attitudes (BBC, 
2020; Wilson, 2020).  
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Early work on the COVID-19 pandemic also noted an increase in nationalistic rhetoric to 
promote both the acceptance of legitimate measures designed to prevent the spread of disease 
and authoritarian policies disguised as such (Nossem, 2020; Zarhloule, 2020). Other research has 
demonstrated that perceived existential threat from the COVID-19 pandemic increases 
prejudicial attitudes toward outgroups, such as the Chinese (Tabri, Hollingshead & Wohl, 2020). 
Scholars have also documented a positive relationship between certain types of COVID-19 
media exposure and the expression of prejudice toward foreigners (Sorokowski et al. 2020). 
However, much of this early work has not examined the role of classic psychological predictors 
of prejudice toward outgroups, such as right-wing authoritarianism or social dominance 
orientation, nor has it fully investigated the joint effect of predictors of prejudice and threat on 
prejudicial attitudes. More research on these predictors is warranted. 
Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
Classic work demonstrated the link between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism (Adorno 
et al., 1950), and more recent research has established both RWA and SDO, two individual-level 
right-wing dimensions, as robust, independent predictors of prejudice and intolerance 
(Altemeyer, 1981; Crawford and Pilanski, 2014; Diaz-Veizades, Widaman, Little & Gibbs, 1995; 
Duckitt, 2001; Sibley, Robertson & Wilson, 2006; Wilson & Sibley, 2013). In Duckitt’s (2001; 
2009) dual process motivational model, both RWA and SDO are conceptualised as value-
attitude-belief dimensions that interact with social environmental factors. Early social and 
environmental experiences favor or cause personality dispositions; in turn, these dispositions 
encourage different world views, which then interact to generate motivational goals, such as the 
motivational goal of threat-control. Finally, value-attitude-belief dimensions, such as RWA or 
SDO, represent expressions of these motivational goals (Duckitt, 2001; 2009).  
THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
 
While the motivational goals behind these dimensions are chronically salient, external 
conditions can heighten their activation, and both RWA and SDO appear to be reactive to 
external circumstances (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Duckitt, 2001; 2006; 2009; Duckitt and 
Fischer, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, 2010; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss & Heled, 2010). 
However, RWA is in part an ideological response to fear, threat and uncertainty, and only for 
RWA, not SDO, do attitudinal manifestations appear to be consistently responsive to threat 
(Lindén, Björklind & Bäckström, 2018; Mirisola, Roccato, Russo, Spagna & Vieno, 2014; 
Oyamot, Borgida & Fisher, 2006; Rickert, 1998; Sibley et al. 2006; Stenner, 2005). For example, 
RWA interacts with the perception of threat to both increase support for anti-democratic policies, 
such as increased governmental surveillance power, and to decrease support for human rights 
(Cohrs, Maes, Moschner & Kielmann, 2007; Kossowska et al. 2011). Moreover, people high in 
RWA are motivated to support any measures they perceive to be protective of the ingroup 
regardless of negative consequences, including the use of violence to address social problems 
(Fetchenhauer & Bierhoff, 2004; Kossowska et al. 2011). The characteristics of prejudice 
associated with RWA also reflect its underlying cognitive and motivational schemas (Duckitt, 
2001). Individuals high in RWA typically characterise outgroups as disorderly, immoral, deviant, 
and threatening to ingroup safety; conversely, ingroup members are normal, socially conforming, 
moral, and under threat from outgroups (Duckitt, 2001; Jackson & Gaaertner, 2010; Schaffer & 
Duckitt, 2013).  
High levels of RWA and SDO are thus associated with less favorable attitudes towards 
migrant groups (Craig & Richeson, 2014; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Oyamot et al. 2006; Perry, 
Paradies & Pedersen, 2015). Indeed, both RWA and SDO predict an increased willingness to 
engage in the active persecution of immigrants, though the situations that prime this response in 
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people high in RWA and SDO are different: Those high in RWA are more willing to engage in 
the active persecution of immigrants who are unwilling to assimilate to the predominant culture, 
while those high in SDO are more likely to persecute immigrants who are willing to assimilate 
(Thomsen, Green, and Sidanius, 2008). Furthermore, Duckitt and Sibley (2010) found that RWA 
predicts opposition to immigration only when the immigrant group is perceived to be an 
economic or cultural threat, while SDO consistently predicts negative attitudes toward 
immigrants irrespective of perceived threat. Perry et al. (2015) also demonstrated that RWA can 
suppress the pro-social and pro-immigrant effect of other dimensions, including religiosity. 
Finally, higher levels of RWA also predict higher levels of nationalism, belief in the superiority 
of one’s own nation, patriotism, and attachment to one’s country and the values for which it 
stands (Osborne, Milojev & Sibley, 2017).  
Despite this evidence, little is known about exactly how RWA and SDO might interact 
with the existential threat posed by a global outbreak of a lethal, contagious disease to affect 
wider expressions of authoritarian attitudes. There is, however, some instructive research in this 
area, though it does tend to be predicated upon different (and sometimes competing) 
psychological processes for RWA and SDO, which has implications for different causal models. 
For instance, Mirels and Dean (2006) found that those scoring higher in RWA overestimated the 
proportion of LGBT+ people living with HIV, while Collani, Grumm and Streicher (2010) found 
that both RWA and SDO predicted prejudice toward people living with HIV or AIDS, effects 
which were partially mediated by (false) beliefs about the personal risk of infection. Likewise, 
upon investigating attitudes related to the Ebola epidemic in a German sample, Stümer et al. 
(2017) reported that the relationship between RWA and support for quarantining African 
migrants and closing the border was mediated by normative threat. Meanwhile, however, Green 
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et al. (2010) discovered that SDO mediated the relationships between germ aversion and support 
for assimilationist immigration criteria, health immigration criteria, and the desire to reduce the 
percentage of foreigners. 
In short, we believe that there is scope to test classic theories of RWA and SDO during 
the current global pandemic, particularly with respect to the former’s sensitivity to threat. We 
thus hypothesize that disease-related threat will moderate the relationship between RWA and 
ethnocentric attitudes: As levels of existential threat increase, so too should the association 
between RWA and ethnocentric attitudes (i.e., nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment). In 
contrast, we do not expect disease-related threat to moderate the association between SDO and 
prejudicial attitudes. 
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Data and Methods 
We analyze national survey data collected from the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland 
during the early phases of lockdown in both countries as part of the COVID-19 Psychological 
Research Consortium (C19PRC) Study. C19PRC is a longitudinal, multi-country study that aims 
to assess the psychological, social, economic, and political impact of the COVID-19 virus in the 
general population (Authors, 2020). The first waves of the study, C19PRC-UKW1 in the UK and 
C19PRC-ROIW1 in the Republic of Ireland, involved the recruitment of large national samples of 
adults from the UK (N = 2,025) and Ireland (N = 1,041) by the survey company Qualtrics. Data 
for the UK was collected between March 23rd to 28th, 2020, approximately eight weeks after the 
first confirmed COVID-19 case there and during a time of rapidly increasing infections (strict 
lockdown measures were announced by the British prime minister on March 23rd, the same day 
our survey was fielded). Data for the Irish sample was collected between March 31st and April 
5th, 2020, approximately four weeks after the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Ireland (and 
two days after the Irish Taoiseach announced that people were not to leave their homes except for 
very limited purposes).  
Research suggests that Qualtrics approximates probability-based samples reasonably well 
when quotas are used (e.g., demographic characteristics and responses to other socio-political 
questions; Zack, Kennedy & Long, 2019). Thus, we employed stratified quota sampling methods 
to ensure that the data collected was representative in terms of age, sex, and household income in 
the UK, and the same demographic indicators plus geographic region in Ireland. Subsequent 
checks confirmed sample representativeness in terms of the number of people in the household 
and other important socio-demographic characteristics (for details of recruitment, sampling, and 
the complete list of measures administered, see Authors, 2020). The full panel dataset will be 
deposited to the UK Data Archive and Open Science Framework approximately six months after 
data collection for the project has been completed.  
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Key Measures  
Nationalism: British/Irish nationalism was assessed by two items adapted from Davidov (2011): 
1) “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the 
British/Irish”; and 2) “Generally speaking, Britain/Ireland is a better country than most other 
countries.” Responses were measured on 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” 
to 5 “strongly agree.” These items were combined into a single scale ranging from 0 to 1 (UK: M 
= 0.55, SD = 0.24, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80; ROI: M = 0.62, SD = 0.21, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70). 
The exact question wording for these and other psychological measures in this study, as well as 
descriptive statistics, are available in the Supplemental Appendix. 
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: Three items from the British Social Attitudes Survey (2015) 
were used to assess respondents’ attitudes towards migrants: 1) “Would you say it is generally bad 
or good for Britain's/Ireland’s economy that migrants come to Britain/Ireland from other 
countries?” (using a 10-point scale ranging from 1 “extremely bad” to 10 “extremely good”; 
reverse coded and scaled from 0 to 1 to indicate anti-immigration attitudes; UK: M = 0.41, SD = 
0.26; ROI: M = 0.41, SD = 0.26); 2) “Would you say that Britain's/Ireland’s cultural life is 
generally undermined or enriched by migrants coming to live here from other countries?” (using 
a 10-point scale ranging from 1 “undermined” to 10 “enriched”; reverse coded and scaled from 0 
to 1; UK: M = 0.44, SD = 0.28; ROI: M = 0.41, SD = 0.27); and 3) “Some migrants make use of 
Britain's/Ireland’s schools, increasing the demand on them. However, many migrants also pay 
taxes which support schools and some also work in schools. Do you think that, on balance, 
migration to Britain/Ireland reduces or increases pressure on the schools across the whole of 
Britain/Ireland?” (using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 “reduces pressure a lot” to 5 “increases 
pressure a lot”; scaled to range from 0 to 1; UK: M = 0.60, SD = 0.25; ROI: M = 0.59, SD = 0.25).  
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA): The 6-item Very Short Authoritarianism Scale 
(VSA; Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018) was used to assess respondents’ levels of RWA. Items include 
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“What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity”; “God’s 
laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late”; 
and “Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws” (reverse-worded). 
Responses were collected on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 
“strongly agree.” Bizumic and Duckitt (2018) report satisfactory internal consistency and 
predictive validity; these 6 items were combined into a single scale ranging from 0 to 1 (UK: M = 
0.51, SD = 0.17, alpha = 0.67; ROI: M = 0.52, SD = 0.17, alpha = 0.58). 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO): Respondents’ levels of social dominance were 
assessed using the 8-item SDO7 scale (Ho et al., 2015). Respondents were asked the extent to which 
they opposed/favored statements such as: “An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and 
others to be on the bottom”; “some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups”; and “we 
should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups” (reverse-scored). Responses 
ranged from 1 “strongly oppose” to 5 “strongly favour” on a 5-point Likert scale. Ho et al. (2015) 
report good criterion and construct validity; these 8-items were combined into a single ranging 
from 0 to 1 (UK: M = 0.36, SD = 0.18, alpha = 0.84; ROI: M = 0.41, SD = 0.21; Cronbach’s alpha 
= 0.79). 
COVID-19 Anxiety (Proxy for Existential Threat): Respondents were asked “how anxious 
are you about the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic?” and responded by positioning a slider 
anchored by 0 “not at all anxious” and 100 “extremely anxious”. This produced continuous scores 
ranging from 0 to 100 with higher scores reflecting higher levels of COVID-19-related anxiety; 
for ease of interpretation we rescaled this item to range from 0 to 1 (UK: M = 0.68, SD = 0.25; 
ROI: M = 0.72, SD = 0.24). Importantly, this question was asked after we measured attitudes 
toward our key outcomes and psychological constructs to avoid inadvertently priming responses 
to RWA, SDO, nationalism, and anti-immigrant sentiment.  
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Political and Ideological Orientations: Three questions, adapted from the 2014-2023 
British Election Study (2017), asked respondents how they would describe their 1) political 
orientation (on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 “left-wing” to 10 “right-wing”; rescaled to range 
from 0 to 1; UK: M = 0.48, SD = 0.21; ROI: M = 0.46, SD = 0.21); 2) ideological orientation 
toward fiscal issues such as taxes and government spending (on a 10-point scale from 1 ‘very 
liberal’ to 10 ‘very conservative’; rescaled to range from 0 to 1; UK: M = 0.49, SD = 0.22; ROI: 
M = 0.47, SD = 0.22); and 3) ideological orientation toward social issues such as abortion and 
same-sex marriage (on a 10-point scale from 1 “very liberal” to 10 “very conservative”; rescaled 
to range from 0 to 1; UK: M = 0.36, SD = 0.27; ROI: M = 0.35, SD = 0.31). 
Socio-Demographic Control Variables: Participants self-reported their age (in years; 
rescaled from 0 to 1 for interpretability; UK: M = 0.42; SD = 0.24; ROI: M = 0.39, SD = 0.23), 
gender (dummy-coded with females plus 6 respondents with non-traditional gender identities in 
the UK and 3 in Ireland serving as the reference category; UK: M = 0.48; SD = 0.50; ROI: M = 
0.48, SD = 0.50), educational attainment (dummy-coded with those having earned a bachelor’s 
degree or higher as the reference category; in the UK low education indicates those who have no 
formal qualifications or only technical qualifications, M = 0.13; SD = 0.34, while moderate 
education refers to those with GCSEs, A-Levels, or a Diploma, M = 0.43; SD = 0.49; in Ireland, 
low education identifies anyone who below a post-secondary qualification, M = 0.30, SD = 0.46), 
gross household income in 2019 (UK: 5 income bands rescaled from 0 to 1, M = 0.50, SD = 0.36; 
ROI: 10 income bands rescaled from 0 to 1, M = 0.25, SD = 0.24), and whether they were born 
outside of the country (dummy coded with those born in the UK/Ireland as the reference category; 
UK: M = 0.09; SD = 0.29; ROI: M = 0.29; SD = 0.46). 
The zero-order correlations for all measures are presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Zero-Order Correlation Matrix Among Key Variables (UK below diagonal, Ireland above 
diagonal) 
 
Republic of Ireland 
Ireland → 
UK ↓ 
Nat Econ Cul Res RWA SDO Anx L-R Soc 
Con 
Fis 
Con 
Age Male Non-
native 
Low 
Ed 
Mod 
Ed 
Income 
Nationalism --  0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.07 -0.16 0.01 -- 0.06 
Economy 0.28 --  0.74 0.36 0.16 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.04 -0.06 -0.15 0.18 --  -0.07 
Culture 0.29 0.79 --  0.34 0.20 0.29 0.05 0.06 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.12 0.21 --  -0.03 
Resources 0.18 0.42 0.42 --  0.07 -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.23 -0.02 -0.13 0.07 --  0.03 
RWA 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.28 --  0.23 0.19 0.29 0.41 0.26 0.16 -0.05 0.04 0.08 --  -0.01 
SDO 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.05 0.33 --  -0.03 0.28 0.24 0.19 -0.11 0.10 0.05 0.05 -- 0.10 
 Anxiety 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.12 -0.07 -- 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.17 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -- 0.02 
Left-Right 0.36 0.23 0.28 0.19 0.38 0.44 0.04 --  0.36 0.49 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.00 -- 0.13 
Social Con 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.11 0.45 0.39 0.03 0.49 --  0.46 0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.08 -- -0.01 
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Fiscal Con 0.37 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.36 0.40 0.01 0.67 0.53 --  0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -- 0.1 
Age 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.27 0.19 -0.01 0.06 0.18 0.09 0.17 --  0.15 -0.08 0.02 -- 0.07 
Male 0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.12 -0.10 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.21 --  -0.10 0.03 -- 0.16 
Non-UK -0.05 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 -0.04 --  -0.08 -- -0.12 
Low Ed 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.07 -0.03 --  -- -0.22 
Moderate Ed 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.34 --  -- 
Income 0.02 -0.16 -0.12 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.12 -0.03 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.03 -0.11 -0.17  -- 
United Kingdom 
Notes: Cell entries contain zero-order correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r). Data from the United 
Kingdom (N=2,025) presented below the diagonal; Republic of Ireland (N=1,041) presented above the 
diagonal.  
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Results 
To test whether existential threat moderates the association between authoritarianism and 
political attitudes, we regressed nationalism and the three anti-immigrant sentiment outcomes on 
RWA, COVID-19 anxiety, and their interaction (product term), as well as SDO (and its 
interaction with COVID-19 anxiety) and other socio-demographic control variables. The 
condensed results of these regressions are presented in Table 2 for the UK and Table 3 for the 
Irish data (the full model results are available in Tables A3 and A4 in the Supplemental 
Appendix).. Ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate all models because of the 
pseudo-continuous nature of the outcomes and for ease of interpretation; however, the results do 
not differ substantially if we estimate models with ordinal outcomes using ordered logistic 
regression. The R code and output used for all data manipulation and analyses is available on the 
Open Science Framework website (https://osf.io/w5ktb/).  
To begin, the RWA * COVID-19 anxiety interaction is in the hypothesised direction 
(positively signed) in all of the regression models that we conducted using data from two 
different countries. In other words, the estimated effect of RWA increases in conjunction with 
perceived anxiety about the threat posed by COVID-19, and the size of these estimates is 
relatively large compared to other predictors in the models using the same 0 to 1 scale (see Table 
A3 for the full set of estimates). In the UK data (Table 2), the estimates for the unadjusted 
(without demographic and political covariates) interaction between RWA and anxiety are 
statistically significant at the .05 level for two of the four outcomes: COVID-19 anxiety 
moderates the effect of RWA on nationalism (b = 0.34, se  = 0.12, p = 0.00; two-tailed) and anti-
immigrant sentiment related to the economy (b = 0.33, se  = 0.12, p = 0.01; two-tailed). The 
interaction is significant at the .10 level for the outcomes related to the notion that immigrants 
place pressure on resources (b = 0.24, se = 0.13, p = 0.06) and harm culture (b = 0.23, se  = 0.13, 
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p = 0.09; two-tailed). Importantly, these interaction effects are very similar even after 
introducing a range of socio-demographic and political covariates (i.e., the ‘adjusted’ estimates). 
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Table 2. Regression Results from the United Kingdom  
 
Nationalism Economy Resources Culture 
  Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
(Intercept) .34** 
(.05) 
[.25, .43] 
p=.00 
.25** 
(.05) 
[.16, .34] 
p=.00 
.20** 
(.05) 
[.11, .30] 
p=.00 
.23** 
(.05) 
[.14, .33] 
p=.00 
.48** 
(.05) 
[.39, .58] 
p=.00 
.38** 
(.05) 
[.28, .48] 
p=.00 
.07 
(.05) 
[-.03, .17] 
p=.16 
.07 
(.05) 
[-.03, .17] 
p=.17 
RWA .19* 
(.09) 
[.01, .36] 
p=.03 
.08 
(.08) 
[-.09, .24] 
p=.38 
.27** 
(.09) 
[.09 .45] 
p=.00 
.20* 
(0.09) 
[.02, .37] 
p=.03 
.28** 
(.09) 
[.09, .46] 
p=.00 
.20* 
(.09) 
[.02, .38] 
p=.03 
.46** 
(.10) 
[.27, .65] 
p=.00 
.37** 
(.09) 
[.18, .55] 
p=.00 
SDO .28** 
(.09) 
[.11, .45] 
p=.00 
.18* 
(.08) 
[.01, .34] 
p=.04 
.28** 
(.09) 
[.11, .46] 
p=.00 
.27** 
(.09) 
[.10, .44] 
p=.00 
-.05 
(.09) 
[-.23, .13] 
p=.62 
-.03 
(.09) 
[-.20, .15] 
p=.78 
.49** 
(.10) 
[.31, .68] 
p=.00 
.47** 
(.09) 
[.28, .65] 
p=.00 
COVID-19 
Anxiety 
-.16* 
(.07) 
[-.28, -.03] 
p=.02 
-.14* 
(.06) 
[-.26, -.01] 
p=.03 
-.19** 
(.07) 
[-.33, -.06] 
p=.00 
-.17** 
(.07) 
[-.30, -.04] 
p=.01 
-.12† 
(.07) 
[-.26, .02] 
p=.08 
-.10 
(.07) 
[-.23, .04] 
p=.15 
-.08 
(.07) 
[-.22, .06] 
p=.25 
-.06 
(.07) 
[-.19, .08] 
p=.41 
RWA * 
Anxiety 
.34** 
(.12) 
[.11, .57] 
p=.00 
.34** 
(.12) 
[.11, .56] 
p=.00 
.33** 
(.12) 
[.08, .57] 
p=.01 
.27* 
(.12) 
[.03, .51] 
p=.03 
.24† 
(.13) 
[-.01, .49] 
p=.06 
.21† 
(.12) 
[-.04, .45] 
p=.09 
.23† 
(.13) 
[-.03, .48] 
p=.09 
.17 
(.13) 
[-.08, .42] 
p=.18 
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SDO * 
Anxiety 
.02 
(.12) 
[-.21, .25] 
p=.89 
-.02 
(.11) 
[-.25, .20] 
p=.84 
-.06 
(.12) 
[-.30, .19] 
p=.65 
-.04 
(.12) 
[-.28, .19] 
p=.72 
-.04 
(.13) 
[-.29, .21] 
p=.76 
-.09 
(.12) 
[-.33, .15] 
p=.46 
-.28* 
(.13) 
[-.54, -.03] 
p=.03 
-.27* 
(.13) 
[-.52, -.03] 
p=.03 
 F 85.08** 43.14** 83.93** 43.65**  36.75**  26.41** 116.68**  56.81 
Adjusted R2 .17 .23 .17 .23 .08 .15 .22 .18 
Notes: N = 2,025. Cell entries are unstandardized estimates from an ordinary least squares regression, 
with standard errors in parentheses, 95% confidence intervals in brackets, and rounded p-values. Bolded 
entries show the estimates from the hypothesized RWA * anxiety interaction. Estimates for the control 
variables are not presented here; the full model results with these estimates are available in Table A3 in 
the Supplemental Appendix. p-values. ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10.  
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In the Irish data (Table 3), the estimates for the unadjusted interaction between RWA and 
anxiety are statistically significant at the .05 level for three of the four outcomes: COVID-19 
anxiety moderates the effect of RWA on nationalism (b = 0.38, se  = 0.16, p = 0.02; two-tailed), 
immigrants hurt the economy (b = 0.43, se  = 0.19, p = 0.02; two-tailed), and immigrants harm 
culture (b = 0.66, se  = 0.19, p = 0.00; two-tailed). The interaction is not statistically significant 
for the outcome related to resources (b = 0.23, se = 0.19, p = 0.22). Once again, these interaction 
effects are largely unchanged in terms of their estimated effect and statistical significance even 
after introducing a range of socio-demographic and political covariates.1 In sum, we take the 
results from the UK and Ireland as strong evidence supporting our expectation regarding the 
interaction between RWA and COVID-19 threat. 
  
 
1 We also calculated adjusted p-values for the false discovery rate -- that is, the expected proportion of false 
discoveries amongst the rejected hypotheses -- using a Benjamini & Hochberg (1995) method from the 
‘multcomp’ package in R. Overall, the RWA * anxiety interaction was statistically significant at the p < .05 
level (two-tailed) in 3 out of 8 models from the UK and Ireland and at the p < .10 in 5 out of 8 cases.   
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Table 3. Regression Results from the Republic of Ireland 
 Nationalism Economy Resources Culture   
  Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
(Intercept) .61** 
(.06) 
[.49, .73] 
p=.00 
.60** 
(.06) 
[.48, .73] 
p=.00 
.31** 
(.07) 
[.16, .45] 
p=.00 
.37** 
(.08) 
[.22, .52] 
p=.00 
.64** 
(.07) 
[.50, .78] 
p=.00 
.57** 
(.07) 
[.43, .72] 
p=.00 
.29** 
(.07) 
[.14, .43] 
p=.00 
.31** 
(.08) 
[.16, .46] 
p=.00 
RWA -.24* 
(.12) 
[-.48, -.00] 
p=.05 
-.24 
(.12) 
[-.48, -.00] 
p=.05 
-.13 
(.14) 
[-.41 .15] 
p=.37 
-.12 
(.14) 
[-.40, .16] 
p=.41 
-.05 
(.14) 
[-.33, .23] 
p=.71 
-.06 
(.14) 
[-.34, .21] 
p=.66 
-.26† 
(.15) 
[-.55, .03] 
p=.08 
-.23 
(.14) 
[-.52, .05] 
p=.11 
SDO .09 
(.10) 
[-.11, .29] 
p=.37    
.07 
(.10) 
[-.12, .27] 
p=.48    
.33** 
(.12) 
[.10, .57] 
p=.01    
.34** 
(.12) 
[.11, .57] 
p=.00    
-.17 
(.12) 
[-.40, .06] 
p=.16    
-.11 
(.12) 
[-.34, .12] 
p=.35    
.53** 
(.12) 
[.29, .77] 
p=.00    
.51** 
(.12) 
[.28, .74] 
p=.00 
COVID-19 
Anxiety 
-.07 
(.09) 
[-.24, .10] 
p=.43    
-.09 
(.09) 
[-.26, .08] 
p=.30    
-.13 
(.10) 
[-.33, .08] 
p=.22    
-.13 
(.10) 
[-.33, .07] 
p=.19    
-.12 
(.10) 
[-.32, .08] 
p=.24    
-.13 
(.10) 
[-.32, .07] 
p=.19    
-.19† 
(.10) 
[-.39, .01] 
p=.07    
-.18† 
(.10) 
[-.38, .02] 
p=.08  
RWA * 
Anxiety 
.38* 
(.16) 
[.07, .69] 
p=.02    
.38* 
(.16) 
[.07, .69] 
p=.02    
.43* 
(.19) 
[.06, .80] 
p=.02    
.37* 
(.19) 
[.00, .73] 
p=.05    
.23 
(.19) 
[-.14, .60] 
p=.22    
.18 
(.18) 
[-.18, .54] 
p=.33    
.66** 
(.19) 
[.28, 1.04] 
p=.00    
.56** 
(.19) 
[.19, .93] 
p=.00   
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SDO * 
Anxiety 
-.01 
(.13) 
[-.27, .25] 
p=.92    
.00 
(.13) 
[-.25, .26] 
p=.98    
-.14 
(.16) 
[-.45, .17] 
p=.37    
-.09 
(.15) 
[-.39, .21] 
p=.56    
.15 
(.16) 
[-.16, .45] 
p=.35    
.14 
(.15) 
[-.16, .43] 
p=.37    
-.26 
(.16) 
[-.57, .06] 
p=.11    
-.20 
(.16) 
[-.50, .11] 
p=.21    
 F 6.79** 5.76** 13.71** 11.96**  3.03*  6.97** 25.85**  16.15** 
Adjusted R2 .03    .06   .06    .12    .01    .07    .11    .16 
Notes: N = 1,041. Cell entries are unstandardized estimates from an ordinary least squares regression, 
with standard errors in parentheses, 95% confidence intervals in brackets, and rounded p-values. Bolded 
entries show the estimates from the hypothesized RWA * anxiety interaction. Estimates for the control 
variables are not presented here; the full model results with these estimates are available in Table A4 in 
the Supplemental Appendix. p-values. ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10. 
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In contrast, the SDO * COVID-19 anxiety interaction is in the wrong direction in three of 
the four unadjusted models in both the UK (Table 2) and Ireland (Table 3); the results do not 
change when covariates are included in the models. Moreover, the SDO * anxiety interaction is 
only statistically significant for the outcome related to culture in the Irish (b = -0.28, se  = 0.13, p 
= 0.03; two-tailed), but again, this effect is in the wrong direction implying that as threat 
increases, the coefficient for SDO decreases. None of the SDO * anxiety interactions are 
statistically significant in the UK data. These results suggest that disease-related threat does not 
moderate the effect of SDO and political attitudes. 
It is also worth noting that in the UK data right-wing political views and conservative 
ideological orientations are generally associated with increased levels of nationalism and anti-
immigrant sentiment (though fiscal conservatives appear less likely to report that immigrants 
harm culture; social conservatives are less likely to report that immigrants pressure resources), as 
are those at lower levels of educational attainment. There is a small gender effect across all 
models suggesting that men are slightly more nationalistic but less likely to hold anti-immigrant 
views -- again, these estimates are relatively small compared to other coviates. Older individuals 
appear more likely to associate immigrants with placing additional pressure on material 
resources and being bad for the cultural life of Britain, while those with higher incomes are less 
likely to state that immigrants are bad for Britain’s economy. Finally, those born outside the UK 
are perhaps unsurprisingly less likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes.  
Examining the socio-political covariates from the Irish data (Table 3), we see that the 
statistically significant predictors are necessarily political or ideological orientations. Instead, 
low educational attainment is consistently associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants. 
As we saw with the UK data, respondents who were foreign born were more likely to hold 
ethnocentric views.  
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To investigate the dynamics of the RWA * COVID-19 anxiety interactions in more 
detail, we plotted the changes in the conditional coefficient of authoritarianism as a function of 
COVID-19 anxiety in Figure 1 for the UK and Figure 2 for Ireland using the interplot package in 
R. Scholars recommend that conditional effects are calculated from the marginal effect at every 
observed value of the moderator, in this case COVID-19 anxiety, to properly interpret 
interactions (e.g., see Berry, Golder, & Milton 2012; Brambor, Clark, & Golder 2006). The plots 
clearly demonstrate that the RWA * COVID-19 interaction is both statistically and substantively 
interesting: The effect of RWA on nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment increases 
substantially in conjunction with heightened perceptions of existential threat from the COVID-19 
pandemic in both countries. Comparing the figures from both countries, we see that the 
coefficient for RWA is statistically significant throughout the entire range of values of COVID-
19 anxiety moderator in the UK. However, in Ireland, the estimate for RWA only reaches 
statistical significance at relatively high levels of disease-related threat (i.e., the upper quartile of 
the anxiety distribution).   
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Figure 1. Conditional Effect of RWA on Nationalism and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment at Different 
Levels of COVID-19 Anxiety in the United Kingdom 
 
Notes: Each plot shows the estimated conditional effect of right-wing authoritarianism on the 
outcome listed in bold at different levels of disease-related anxiety based upon the adjusted 
estimates from Table 2. The distribution of the moderator (COVID-19 Anxiety) is displayed 
above the x-axis in the upper left panel; 95% confidence intervals are shaded in grey. The 
caption in the bottom right corner of each plot contains the confidence intervals of the difference 
between the conditioned effects of anxiety at the minimum and maximum values 
authoritarianism. The plots suggest that the estimated effect of RWA increases as levels of 
anxiety rise.  
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Figure 2. Conditional Effect of RWA on Nationalism and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment at Different 
Levels of COVID-19 Anxiety in the Republic of Ireland 
 
Notes: Each plot shows the estimated conditional effect of right-wing authoritarianism on the 
outcome listed in bold at different levels of anxiety based upon the adjusted estimates from Table 
2. The distribution of the moderator (COVID-19 Anxiety) is displayed above the x-axis in the 
upper left panel; 95% confidence intervals are shaded in grey. The caption in the bottom right 
corner of each plot contains the confidence intervals of the difference between the conditioned 
effects of anxiety at the minimum and maximum values authoritarianism. The plots suggest that 
the estimated effect of RWA increases as levels of anxiety rise.  
 
Discussion 
Our study contributes to the literature on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation by demonstrating that existential disease-related threats appear to moderate 
authoritarian predispositions, thus influencing their expression on ethnocentric political attitudes. 
Using data from two large, nationally representative samples of adults in the UK and Republic of 
Ireland collected during the initial phases of strict lockdown measures in those countries, we find 
that while authoritarianism is associated with a non-zero effect on nationalism and anti-
immigrant sentiment at low levels of anxiety (and in fact, negative association in Ireland), the 
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overall impact of RWA is rather small. Only when perceived threat – operationalised here as a 
measure of anxiety about the COVID-19 pandemic – is high does RWA exert a substantial effect 
on those nationalism and anti-immigration attitudes. This is interesting because most extant 
literature examines how threats from specific outgroups activate authoritarian predispositions 
and generate backlashes against those same outgroups. Here, the threat does not arise from an 
inherently threatening outgroup but a virus; yet, authoritarians still respond by becoming more 
nationalistic and more anti-immigrant. 
There are, of course, some limitations of our study that merit discussion. First, the cross-
sectional nature of our data means that it is impossible to disentangle the causal relationships 
among RWA, threat, nationalism, and anti-immigrant sentiment. For instance, when COVID-19 
anxiety is regressed on RWA, SDO, and the other socio-demographic control variables used in 
our prior analyses, we find that RWA is a statistically significant and positively signed predictor 
of perceived anxiety in both the UK (b = 0.19, se  = 0.04, p = 0.00) and Irish  (b = 0.24, se  = 
0.05, p = 0.00) samples, as is age and income (UK-only). Interestingly, SDO is negatively 
associated with COVID-19 anxiety (UK: b = -0.17, se  = 0.04, p = 0.00; ROI: b = -0.06, se  = 
0.04, p = 0.10), along with being male and non-native born (ROI-only). Thus, the relationships 
we have modeled are likely more nuanced than the cross-sectional data can handle. Second, 
while our sample is large and nationally representative, it is not a probability-based sample, 
which means that there may be individuals with differential probabilities of selection into the 
study with unknown (and unknowable) effects on our key measures. Third, we used a single 
proxy of anxiety related to the COVID-19 pandemic as a measure of existential threat; in 
hindsight, it would have been better to have multiple, direct measures of our threat moderator, 
given its hypothesized role in moderating RWA. Finally, we only assessed attitudes toward 
nationalism and immigration, but one could imagine a number of other interesting outcomes that 
may be predicted by the intersection of existential threat and authoritarianism. 
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Future research should build upon our work by investigating the nature and consequences 
of existential threat on RWA and SDO, as well as its interactive effect on political attitudes and 
behavior toward in- and out-groups. One way to gain traction on this problem would be to design 
longitudinal studies to examine how threats at one time period affect subsequent political 
attitudes. It would be particularly interesting to know whether our findings are unique to the UK 
and Ireland, or if they would replicate in other non-Western societies (we suspect that they would 
but acknowledge it is an empirical question).  
Ultimately, we believe our findings are important because they portend to the likely 
consequences of public opinion in countries across the world. That is, grave threats to humanity 
from the COVID-19 pandemic appear to activate authoritarians in society, which in turn, shifts 
opinion toward nationalistic and anti-immigrant sentiments. One can only imagine how this 
might affect governance in democracies in Europe, North America, and elsewhere in the world 
as the global pandemic continues.  
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Supplemental Appendix 
Table A1. Question Wording and Summary Statistics for Key Measures 
Question Wording (Row 1: UK; Row 2: Ireland) Mean/SD 
Nationalism (5-point agreement scale) 
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more 
like the British/Irish. 
3.09/1.08 
3.32/1.01 
Generally speaking, Britain/Ireland is a better country than most other 
countries. 
3.31/1.06 
3.64/.95 
Attitudes toward Immigrants (first 2 items: 10-point scales; last item: 5-point scale) 
On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is extremely bad and 10 is extremely good, 
would you say it is generally bad or good for Britain’s/Ireland’s economy that 
migrants come to Britain/Ireland from other countries? 
6.29/2.30 
6.29/2.35 
And on a scale from 1 to 10, would you say that Britain’s/Ireland’s cultural 
life is generally undermined or enriched by migrants coming to live here from 
other countries? 
6.07/2.51 
6.31/2.45 
Some migrants make use of Britain's/Ireland’s schools, increasing the demand 
on them. However many migrants also pay taxes which support schools and 
some also work in schools. Do you think that, on balance, migration to 
Britain/Ireland reduces or increases pressure on the schools across the whole 
of Britain/Ireland? 
3.41/.99 
3.35/1.01 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (5-point agreement scale) 
It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority. (R) 2.54/1.16 2.17/1.17 
What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our 
leaders in unity. 
3.40/1.08 
3.21/1.09 
Strict rules about abortion, pornography, and marriage are necessary for a 
healthy society. 
2.84/1.20 
2.83/1.30 
There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. (R) 4.18/1.01 4.06/1.13 
Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws. (R) 3.05/1.08 3.17/1.12 
The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack 
down harder on troublemakers, if we are going to preserve law and order. 
3.70/1.03 
3.89/.99 
Social Dominance Orientation (5-point agree scale) 
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An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the 
bottom. 
2.75/1.05 
2.61/1.05 
Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top. (R) 3.99/.92 3.93/.98 
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. (R) 3.81/.94 3.99/.89 
It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 2.71/1.09 2.61/1.06 
We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. (R) 4.13/.86 4.22/.84 
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 2.47/1.19 2.41/1.24 
Group equality should not be our primary goal.  3.06/1.07 2.91/1.10 
No one group should dominate in society. (R) 3.89/.96 4.05/1.02 
COVID-19 Anxiety 
How anxious are you about the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic? Move the 
slider below to indicate how anxious you feel where 0 = not at all anxious and 
100 = extremely anxious. 
67.72/24.60 
71.59/24.42 
Notes: Row 1: N = 2,025 (UK). Row 2: N = 1,041 (Ireland). R = reverse-worded; M = Mean; SD 
= Standard Deviation. 
  
THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
 
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables Used in the Regression Analyses 
Variable  
(Row 1: UK; Row 2: Ireland) 
Mean SD Min Median Max 
Nationalism 
 
.55 
.62 
.24 
.21 
0 
0 
.50 
.63 
1 
1 
Anti-Immigrant: Economy 
 
.41 
.41 
.26 
.26 
0 
0 
.33 
.33 
1 
1 
Immigrants Pressure Resources 
 
.60 
.59 
.25 
.25 
0 
0 
.50 
.50 
1 
1 
Anti-Immigrant: Culture 
 
.44 
.41 
.28 
.27 
0 
0 
.44 
.33 
1 
1 
RWA 
 
.51 
.52 
.17 
.17 
0 
0 
.50 
.52 
1 
1 
SDO 
 
.36 
.41 
.18 
.21 
0 
0 
.39 
.44 
1 
1 
Covid-19 Anxiety 
 
.68 
.72 
.25 
.24 
0 
0 
.71 
.77 
1 
1 
Left-Right Politics 
 
.48 
.46 
.21 
.21 
0 
0 
.44 
.44 
1 
1 
Fiscal Conservatism 
 
.49 
.47 
.22 
.22 
0 
0 
.44 
.44 
1 
1 
Social Conservatism 
 
.36 
.35 
.28 
.31 
0 
0 
.44 
.33 
1 
1 
Male 
 
.48 
.48 
.50 
.50 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
Age (in Years) 
 
.42 
.39 
.25 
.23 
0 
0 
.42 
.37 
1 
1 
Low Education 
 
.13 
.30 
.34 
.46 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
Moderate Education 
 
.43 
-- 
.50 
-- 
0 
-- 
0 
-- 
1 
-- 
HH Income 
 
.50 
.25 
.36 
.24 
0 
0 
.50 
.22 
1 
1 
Not Born in UK/Ireland 
 
.09 
.29 
.29 
.46 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
Notes: Row 1: N = 2,025 (UK). Row 2: N = 1,041 (Ireland). 
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Table A3. Full Regression Results for the UK  
 Nationalism Economy Resources Culture   
  Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
(Intercept) .34** 
(.05) 
[.25, .43] 
p=.00 
.25** 
(.05) 
[.16, .34] 
p=.00 
.20** 
(.05) 
[.11, .30] 
p=.00 
.23** 
(.05) 
[.14, .33] 
p=.00 
.48** 
(.05) 
[.39, .58] 
p=.00 
.38** 
(.05) 
[.28, .48] 
p=.00 
.07 
(.05) 
[-.03, .17] 
p=.16 
.07 
(.05) 
[-.03, .17] 
p=.17 
RWA .19* 
(.09) 
[.01, .36] 
p=.03 
.08 
(.08) 
[-.09, .24] 
p=.38 
.27** 
(.09) 
[.09 .45] 
p=.00 
.20* 
(.09) 
[.02, .37] 
p=.03 
.28** 
(.09) 
[.09, .46] 
p=.00 
.20* 
(.09) 
[.02, .38] 
p=.03 
.46** 
(.10) 
[.27, .65] 
p=.00 
.37** 
(.09) 
[.18, .55] 
p=.00 
SDO .28** 
(.09) 
[.11, .45] 
p=.00 
.18* 
(.08) 
[.01, .34] 
p=.04 
.28** 
(.09) 
[.11, .46] 
p=.00 
.27** 
(.09) 
[.10, .44] 
p=.00 
-.05 
(.09) 
[-.23, .13] 
p=.62 
-.03 
(.09) 
[-.20, .15] 
p=.78 
.49** 
(.10) 
[.31, .68] 
p=.00 
.47** 
(.09) 
[.28, .65] 
p=.00 
COVID-19 
Anxiety 
-.16* 
(.07) 
[-.28, -.03] 
p=.02 
-.14* 
(.06) 
[-.26, -.01] 
p=.03 
-.19** 
(.07) 
[-.33, -.06] 
p=.00 
-.17** 
(.07) 
[-.30, -.04] 
p=.01 
-.12† 
(.07) 
[-.26, .02] 
p=.08 
-.10 
(.07) 
[-.23, .04] 
p=.15 
-.08 
(.07) 
[-.22, .06] 
p=.25 
-.06 
(.07) 
[-.19, .08] 
p=.41 
RWA * 
Anxiety 
.34** 
(.12) 
[.11, .57] 
p=.00 
.34** 
(.12) 
[.11, .56] 
p=.00 
.33** 
(.12) 
[.08, .57] 
p=.01 
.27* 
(.12) 
[.03, .51] 
p=.03 
.24† 
(.13) 
[-.01, .49] 
p=.06 
.21† 
(.12) 
[-.04, .45] 
p=.09 
.23† 
(.13) 
[-.03, .48] 
p=.09 
.17 
(.13) 
[-.08, .42] 
p=.18 
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SDO * 
Anxiety 
.02 
(.12) 
[-.21, .25] 
p=.89 
-.02 
(.11) 
[-.25, .20] 
p=.84 
-.06 
(.12) 
[-.30, .19] 
p=.65 
-.04 
(.12) 
[-.28, .19] 
p=.72 
-.04 
(.13) 
[-.29, .21] 
p=.76 
-.09 
(.12) 
[-.33, .15] 
p=.46 
-.28* 
(.13) 
[-.54, -.03] 
p=.03 
-.27* 
(.13) 
[-.52, -.03] 
p=.03 
Left-Right 
Politics 
-- .11** 
(.03) 
[.05, .18] 
p=.00 
-- .06† 
(.03) 
[-.01, .13] 
p=.09 
-- .08* 
(.04) 
[.01, .15] 
p=.03 
-- .12** 
(.04) 
[0.05, .19] 
p=.00 
Fiscal 
Conservatism 
-- .19** 
(.03) 
[.13, .25] 
p=.00 
-- -.03 
(.03) 
[-.09, .03] 
p=.35 
-- .08** 
(.03) 
[.02, .15] 
p=.01 
-- -.09** 
(.03) 
[-.16, -.02] 
p=.01 
Social 
Conservatism 
-- .00 
(.02) 
[-.04, .05] 
p=.91 
-- .06** 
(.02) 
[.01, .11] 
p=.02 
-- -.05* 
(.02) 
[-.10, -.00] 
p=.03 
-- .07** 
(.03) 
[.02, .12] 
p=.00 
Age -- .02 
(.02) 
[-.02, .06] 
p=.43 
-- .04† 
(.02) 
[-.00, .09] 
p=.06 
-- .20** 
(.02) 
[.16, .25] 
p=.00 
-- .07** 
(.02) 
[.02, .11] 
p=.00 
Male 
(Base: 
Female) 
-- .03** 
(.01) 
[.01, .05] 
p=.00 
-- -.04** 
(.01) 
[-.06, -.02] 
p=.00 
-- -.02* 
(.01) 
[-.04, .00] 
p=.03 
-- -.02* 
(.01) 
[-.05, .00] 
p=.04 
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Low 
Education 
(Base: High) 
-- .02 
(.02) 
[-.01, .05] 
p= .15 
-- .06** 
(.02) 
[.03, .10] 
p=.00 
-- .03* 
(.02) 
[.00, .07] 
p=.04 
-- .08** 
(.02) 
[.05, .12] 
p=.00 
Mod 
Education 
(Base: High) 
-- .03* 
(.01) 
[.00, .05] 
p=.02 
-- .06** 
(.01) 
[.03, .08] 
p=.00 
-- .01 
(.01) 
[-.01, .04] 
p=.22 
-- .07 
(.01) 
[.05, .10] 
p=.00 
HH Income -- -.01 
(.01) 
[-.03, .02] 
p=.68 
-- -.09** 
(.02) 
[-.12, -.06] 
p=.00 
-- .01 
(.02) 
[-.02, .04] 
p=.35 
-- -.06 
(.02) 
[-.09, -.03] 
p=.00 
Foreign Born 
(Base: UK-
Born) 
-- -.03† 
(.02) 
[-.06, .00] 
p=.09 
-- -.10** 
(.02) 
[-.13, -.06] 
p=.00 
-- -.08** 
(.02) 
[-.12, -.05] 
p=.00 
-- -.10** 
(0.02) 
[-.14, -.07] 
p=.00 
 F 85.08** 43.14** 83.93** 43.65**  36.75**  26.41** 116.68**  56.81** 
Adjusted R2 .17 .23 .17 .23 .08 .15 .22 0.18 
Notes: N = 2,025. Cell entries are unstandardized estimates from an ordinary least squares regression, 
with standard errors in parentheses, 95% confidence intervals in brackets, and rounded p-values. Bolded 
entries show the estimates from the hypothesized RWA * anxiety interaction. p-values. ** p < .01; * p < 
.05; † p < .10.  
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Table A4.  Full Regression Results for the Republic of Ireland  
 Nationalism Economy Resources Culture   
  Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
Unadjusted 
Estimates 
Adjusted 
Estimates 
(Intercept) .61** 
(.06) 
[.49, .73] 
p=.00 
.60** 
(.06) 
[.48, .73] 
p=.00 
.31** 
(.07) 
[.16, .45] 
p=.00 
.37** 
(.08) 
[.22, .52] 
p=.00 
.64** 
(.07) 
[.50, .78] 
p=.00 
.57** 
(.07) 
[.43, .72] 
p=.00 
.29** 
(.07) 
[.14, .43] 
p=.00 
.31** 
(.08) 
[.16, .46] 
p=.00 
RWA -.24* 
(.12) 
[-.48, -.00] 
p=.05 
-.24 
(.12) 
[-.48, -.00] 
p=.05 
-.13 
(.14) 
[-.41 .15] 
p=.37 
-.12 
(.14) 
[-.40, .16] 
p=.41 
-.05 
(.14) 
[-.33, .23] 
p=.71 
-.06 
(.14) 
[-.34, .21] 
p=.66 
-.26† 
(.15) 
[-.55, .03] 
p=.08 
-.23 
(.14) 
[-.52, .05] 
p=.11 
SDO .09 
(.10) 
[-.11, .29] 
p=.37    
.07 
(.10) 
[-.12, .27] 
p=.48    
.33** 
(.12) 
[.10, .57] 
p=.01    
.34** 
(.12) 
[.11, .57] 
p=.00    
-.17 
(.12) 
[-.40, .06] 
p=.16    
-.11 
(.12) 
[-.34, .12] 
p=.35    
.53** 
(.12) 
[.29, .77] 
p=.00    
.51** 
(.12) 
[.28, .74] 
p=.00 
COVID-19 
Anxiety 
-.07 
(.09) 
[-.24, .10] 
p=.43    
-.09 
(.09) 
[-.26, .08] 
p=.30    
-.13 
(.10) 
[-.33, .08] 
p=.22    
-.13 
(.10) 
[-.33, .07] 
p=.19    
-.12 
(.10) 
[-.32, .08] 
p=.24    
-.13 
(.10) 
[-.32, .07] 
p=.19    
-.19† 
(.10) 
[-.39, .01] 
p=.07    
-.18† 
(.10) 
[-.38, .02] 
p=.08  
RWA * 
Anxiety 
.38* 
(.16) 
[.07, .69] 
p=.02    
.38* 
(.16) 
[.07, .69] 
p=.02    
.43* 
(.19) 
[.06, .80] 
p=.02    
.37* 
(.19) 
[.00, .73] 
p=.05    
.23 
(.19) 
[-.14, .60] 
p=.22    
.18 
(.18) 
[-.18, .54] 
p=.33    
.66** 
(.19) 
[.28, 1.04] 
p=.00    
.56** 
(.19) 
[.19, .93] 
p=.00   
THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
 
SDO * 
Anxiety 
-.01 
(.13) 
[-.27, .25] 
p=.92    
.00 
(.13) 
[-.25, .26] 
p=.98    
-.14 
(.16) 
[-.45, .17] 
p=.37    
-.09 
(.15) 
[-.39, .21] 
p=.56    
.15 
(.16) 
[-.16, .45] 
p=.35    
.14 
(.15) 
[-.16, .43] 
p=.37    
-.26 
(.16) 
[-.57, .06] 
p=.11    
-.20 
(.16) 
[-.50, .11] 
p=.21    
Left-Right 
Politics 
-- .09** 
(.04) 
[.02, .17] 
p=.01    
       -.10* 
(.04) 
[-.18, -.01] 
p=.02    
       -.04 
(.04) 
[-.13, .04] 
p=.31    
       -.07 
(.04) 
[-.15, .02] 
p=.13  
Fiscal 
Conservatism 
-- -.03 
(.04) 
[-.10, .04] 
p=.47    
       -.02 
(.04) 
[-.10, .06] 
p=.62    
       .06 
(.04) 
[-.03, .14] 
p=.18    
       -.07 
(.04) 
[-.15, .02] 
p=.11  
Social 
Conservatism 
-- -.01 
(.03) 
[-.06, .04] 
p=.56    
       .06† 
(.03) 
[-.00, .11] 
p=.06    
       -.03 
(.03) 
[-.09, .03] 
p=.35    
       .08* 
(.03) 
[.02, .14] 
p=.01  
Age -- .04 
(.03) 
[-.02, .10] 
p=.16    
       .06† 
(.04) 
[-.01, .13] 
p=.10    
       .24** 
(.04) 
[.18, .31] 
p=.00    
       .06† 
(.04) 
[-.01, .14] 
p=.07  
Male 
(Base: 
Female) 
-- .01 
(.01) 
[-.01, .04] 
p=.28    
       -.05** 
(.02) 
[-.08, -.02] 
p=.00    
       -.03* 
(.02) 
[-.06, -.00] 
p=.04    
       -.02 
(.02) 
[-.05, .01] 
p=.24   
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Low 
Education 
(Base: High) 
-- -.00 
(.01) 
[-.03, .03] 
p=.93    
       .07** 
(.02) 
[.04, .11] 
p=.00    
       .04* 
(.02) 
[.00, .07] 
p=.03    
       .09** 
(.02) 
[.06, .13] 
p=.00   
HH Income -- .01 
(.03) 
[-.05, .07] 
p=.71    
       -.06† 
(.03) 
[-.13, .01] 
p=.07    
       .02 
(.03) 
[-.04, .09] 
p=.48    
       -.03 
(.03) 
[-.10, .04] 
p=.37   
Foreign Born 
(Base: ROI-
Born) 
-- -.07** 
(.01) 
[-.10, -.04] 
p=.00    
       -.10** 
(.02) 
[-.13, -.06] 
p=.00    
       -.06** 
(.02) 
[-.09, -.03] 
p=.00    
       -.07** 
(.02) 
[-.11, -.04] 
p=.00  
 F 6.79** 5.76** 13.71** 11.96**  3.03*  6.97** 25.85**  16.15** 
Adjusted R2 .03    .06   .06    .12    .01    .07    .11    .16 
Notes: N = 1,041. Cell entries are unstandardized estimates from an ordinary least squares regression, 
with standard errors in parentheses, 95% confidence intervals in brackets, and rounded p-values. Bolded 
entries show the estimates from the hypothesized RWA * anxiety interaction. p-values. ** p < .01; * p < 
.05; † p < .10.  
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Table A5. Test of Statistical Significance for RWA * COVID-19 Anxiety Interaction Using Adjusted P-Values 
for the False Discovery Rate 
 
United Kingdom Republic of Ireland   
  
Nationalism Economy Resources Culture Nationalism Economy Resources Culture 
RWA * Anxiety 
 
 
Unadjusted 
.34 
(.12) 
 
p=.00    
.27 
(.12) 
 
p=.03    
.21 
(.12) 
 
p=.09    
.17 
(.13) 
 
p=.18    
.38 
(.16) 
 
p=.02    
.37 
(.19) 
 
p=.05    
.18 
(.18) 
 
p=.33    
.56 
(.19) 
 
p=.00   
BH adjusted p=.01 p=.04 p=.14 p=.20 p=.06 p=.10 p=.43 p=.01 
Notes: Top cell entries are unstandardized estimates from the full ordinary least squares regression (i.e., 
model with control variables and lower order terms), standard errors in parentheses. Unadjusted p-values 
match the values presented for the full models in Tables 2 and 3. Adjusted p-values were calculated using 
the ‘multcomp’ package in R. BH = Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) method for adjusting the false 
discovery rate (i.e., the expected proportion of false discoveries amongst the rejected hypotheses). 
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Figure A1. Predicted Outcome by Levels of Right-Wing Authoritarianism and COVID-19 Anxiety 
in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland 
 
Notes: Predicted values calculated from the adjusted estimates presented in Tables A3 and A4.  
